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WHAT PART OF 'KNOW' DON'T You UNDERSTAND? 
Everything is funny as long as it is happening to someone else. 
-Will Rogers 
I don't really like jokes; I only like the laughing. 
-George, aged 4 
The cause of laughter in every case is simply the sudden perception of 
the incongruity between a concept and the real objects which have been 
thought through it in some relation, and laughter itself is just the expression 
of this incongruity. 
-Arthur Schopenhauer, 
some time before, or after, 
allegedly shoving a seamstress down the stairs'! 
The above three sententiae profundae express the three classical 
theories of humour and laughter; the "superiority" theory often attributed 
to Hobbes, the "relief' or "discharge" theory-a descendent in some respects 
of the superiority theory-generally attributed to Freud(-ians), and the 
"incongruity" theory, which Kant is credited with having suggested and 
Schopenhauer refined. According to the first theory, humour is essentially 
a matter of laughing at the misfortunes of those less fortunate than oneself; 
according to the second, it is primarily a function of the emotional relief 
experienced by recognising that a joke isn't on oneself; and according to 
the third, humour is a funny hah-hah reaction to the funny peculiar. The 
divisions between these theories are not always neat. Not renowned for 
his reflections on the comic, Descartes in The Passions of the Soul wrote 
that laughter often involves derision or hatred directed at some imperfec­
tion of another [Art. 126 & 178], joy in seeing that the evil we laugh at 
cannot harm us, or in averting it ourselves [Art. 127], and the surprise of 
something novel and unexpected [Art. 178]. These are the primary 
cognitive and sensory causes of laughter for Descartes but what laughter 
is was to be explained in hydraulic terms: a sudden heating and expansion 
of the blood from the heart through the arterial vein causing an immediate 
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12 DEBORAH BROWN 
swelling of the lungs and muscles of the chest, throat and diaphragm, 
forcing air in an "explosive" fashion out of the windpipe while contract­
ing the facial muscles into a grin [Art. 124]. The explanatory significance 
of the effects of a sudden and unexpected surprise on the diaphragm was 
also not lost on Descartes's predecessor, Juan Luis Vives, who "solved" 
thereby the ancient mystery of why some Roman soldiers, stabbed in the 
armpits, died laughing.2 
Often accompanying these theories was a division, no longer obvious 
to many, between wit and humour. Wit [ingenium in the Latin tradition] 
was thought to be more intellectual, indeed, not really distinct from the 
intellect itself, not emotional and not, on some views, much of a laughing 
matter at alP The medievals often referred to the capacity for laughter, 
risibility, as a proprium, which, although not part of the definition of a 
human being, was a necessary quality following from that of rationality. 
The capacity for laughter was, and still is, regarded as the province of 
human beings, and thus intimately connected with our capacity for rational 
thought. This connection between laughter and rationality has persisted 
through the notion of wit. Humour, on the other hand, is a term with a 
much less sanctified history. In the Hippocratic and Galenic medical tra­
ditions, the term originally denoted the four bodily fluids (blood, phlegm, 
yellow bile and black bile) of our animal nature corresponding to the four 
elements (Earth, Air, Fire and Water), the proportions of which determined 
the mood, temperament and dispositions to certain kinds of passions of a 
person. These dispositions were not fixed but could be improved or altered 
through the medical and other arts. The humours were directly sensitive 
to stimulations of the external and internal senses, and thus a person's 
"humour" was highly susceptible to what they perceived going on around 
them.- During the Renaissance, the study of the humours and abnormal 
psychology generally was a source of fascination. Treatises on the passions 
and their relation to humouric physiology proliferated at the same time at 
which "Comedies of the 'humors'" were emerging.5 Someone could be 
either "in" or "out" of their humour and "to humour" someone was to affect 
the balance of their humours for better or worse. A political speech could, 
for example, easily put the audience out of its humour or, as we would say, 
in a bad mood, and thus being able to control an audience's humour 
through wit or ridicule could give one a political edge.6 Late sixteenth­
and seventeenth-century literature saw the emergence of the "humourist," 
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someone who, like William Shakespeare or Ben Jonson, constructed 
literary types from the characteristics associated with imbalances in the 
bodily humours: the Melancholic, (famously, Hamlet), the Sanguine, the 
Phlegmatic, and the Choleric. In this context, "humour" connoted eccen­
tricity, which was anatomised on the stage to the chagrin of Elizabethan 
Puritans who would have preferred to hear the sixpence spent on seeing a 
Comedy of Humours tinkle instead in the collection plate.? By this asso­
ciation with the physiological, "humour" compared to ''wit'' became a some­
what degraded notion of a disposition to laugh deriving from a perception, 
bordering on pathos, of the ludicrous or incongruous in its particular in­
stantiations. The pratfall may be humorous but it isn't witty. There could 
be a "sense" of humour but wit was concerned with drawing out abstract 
conceptual connections that are not directly the objects of perception. 
Somewhere along the way, probably in the Victorian era, the distinc­
tion between wit and humour became blurred.' It seems today that we no 
longer hear much of a distinction, and if we do not, it is not because we 
have sentimentalised wit but because we have intellectualised humour. 
Where the seventeenth century saw two distinct phenomena we now see 
a genus-humour---of which wit is a species, and we no longer attribute 
to the genus the relation to affect which was in an earlier age characteris­
tic of humour. The affective aspect of humour has been de-emphasised, 
indeed, as we shall see in the case of some theorists, completely denied, 
and it is this tendency that this paper seeks to redress. Many theorists have 
noted that humour mimics reasoning by making abstract conceptual con­
nections, and provides, thereby, occasions for expanding our knowledge 
or exercising our explanatory capacities. The denial of any connection 
between humour and the emotions is part of this relatively recent intel­
lectualisation of the notion of humour, for the emotions are regarded as 
obstacles to reason not allies. I propose to argue that humour cannot play 
such roles with respect to reason and knowledge if understood as a purely 
intellectual, non-affective mode of experience. 
Part of this ascension of an intellectualised conception of humour is 
due to the ascension of the incongruity theory above its rivals, the superi­
ority and relief theories. Theories of humour founded on our baser moral 
or psychological motivations have faded off the map. No wonder. The su­
periority theory is, frankly, daft. Perhaps any joke can serve as an occasion 
for self-aggrandisement-it is good for the ego to make people laugh­
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but it is hard to see the content of every joke or witticism as derisive 
towards others. Ethnic humour is typically held up as the paradigm of 
derisive humour, but it seems to me that much of it is self- as opposed to 
other-deprecating. Some of the best (and deliciously nasty) Irish jokes 
have been told to me by Irish folk, Jewish jokes by Jews and Newfie jokes 
by Newfoundlanders. As an Australian, it's difficult to think that one is 
doing oneself any favours by referring to Rolf Harris's Tie Me Kangaroo 
Down, Sport as Australia's favourite love song. (See also: "Are you 
awake?"-the Australian definition of foreplay-and its regional 
variation, "Are you awake, Sis?,,)9 And if I take the piss out of myself, I 
can hardly feel superior to the object of my derision unless, of course, I 
am not all there. Nor is it the case that, as Hobbes thought, wit is unique 
in betraying a sense of the "Oddness or Infirmity" in one's own character. lO 
A self-deprecating Jewish joke is no more witty or moral than the standard 
Polish joke for being self- as opposed to other-deprecating. More often 
than not, though, humour simply has nothing to do with oneself or one's 
fragile ego and may not involve any derision at all. 
This is not to say that humour cannot be used to devastating effect, 
and this is the major reason for its bad press from time to time. In 1711 
Joseph Addison roiled against the ill use of "FALSE HUMOUR" in the 
following understated fashion: 
The ImposlOr of whom I am speaking, descends originally from FALSEHOOD, 
who was the Mother of NONSENSE, who was brought to bed of a Son called 
FRENZY, who Married one of the Daughters of FOLLY, commonly known by 
the Name of LAUGHTER, on whom he begot that Monstrous Infant of which I 
have been speaking. l1 
But using humour to secure one's ill-gotten gains does not make humour 
necessarily derisive towards others. As Francis Hutcheson pointed out in 
1725, if the superiority theory were correct, all laughter would have to 
involve a comparison between ourselves and others and the sudden ap­
pearance of superiority must be sufficient to excite laughter if we attend 
to it. But neither is true, he argues, by way of examples like the following: 
Many an orthodox Scotch presbyterian (which sect few accuse of disregard 
for the holy scriptures) has been put to it to preserve his gravity, upon hearing 
the application of scripture made by his countryman Dr. Pitcairn, as he 
observ'd a crowd in the streets about a mason, who had fallen along with his 
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scaffold, and was overwhelm'd with the ruins of the chimney which he had 
been building, and which fell immediately after the fall of the poor mason; 
"blessed are the dead which die in the lord, for they rest from their labours, 
and their works follow them."12 
Hutcheson argues that the only candidate against which one might feel 
superior in this scenario is the poor mason (it can hardly be either the apostle 
or the doctor) but that opinion should have occurred prior to hearing the 
doctor and occasioned no laughter, When the bystanders do laugh it is not 
because they are comparing themselves favourably to anyone else present.13 
We have perhaps not done justice to the superiority theory by these 
remarks but I'm not convinced it is worth more effort. John Morreall has 
suggested, however, that Hobbes was right to think that a sudden boost in 
a positive emotion can cause laughter and that this idea is essentially 
similar to that upon which the relief theory is based.!4 The relief theory is 
at least in this regard the natural heir of the superiority theory. But the 
laughter caused by a boost in positive emotions, as Morreall points out, 
has nothing essentially to do with feelings of superiority. The whimsical 
if somewhat bleak victims of Edward Gorey's The Gashlycrumb TInies­
an alphabet book like no other, (E is for Ernest who choked on a peach, F 
is for Fanny sucked dry by a leech. , . )-are not occasions for self-ag­
grandisement unless one thinks oneself superior for having avoided in 
childhood so peculiar a fate." But are they occasions for emotional relief? 
Although it is true that if a situation strikes one as threatening one is 
unlikely to find it funny, it does not follow that the absence of threat or the 
relief experienced at discovering this fact is a criterion for what makes a 
situation funny. It's implausible to think, moreover, that even the pretence 
ofa threat is at issne in most humourous situations, In any event, as a psy­
chological theory, the relief theory has not withstood well its own 
experimental testing. Some psychologists have found more evidence for 
the hypothesis that the response to humour depends primarily upon arousal, 
which persists after the "resolution" of the joke and whatever relief may 
subsequently be experienced.!6 And typically the cause of such arousal is 
postulated to be the awareness of some incongruity or absurdity. What has 
thus come to be seen as typical of humour is what at one time was the preserve 
of wit; the recognition of some conceptual absurdity or incongruity, 
The triumph of wit is thus the triumph, by default, of the incongruity 
theory and an intellectualised conception of humour. For Kant and Schopen­
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hauer, this incongruity is a matter of contradiction or conflict between ex­
pectations. Humour, for Kant, is "an affection arising from the sudden 
transformation of a strained expectation into nothing"; for Schopenhauer, 
it arises from the unexpected subsumption of an object under a concept. l7 
The former seems too vague, the latter too specific. And yet the incon­
gruity theory has proved more promising than its two main rivals and 
remains at the forefront of contemporary debates." It does not make 
humour dependent upon particular emotional responses like relief or 
feelings of superiority, and it captures the idea that the absurd is a 
common object of humour. In the example offered by Hutcheson against 
the superiority theory, an incongruity theorist can argue that the by­
standers laugh because of the perceived incongruity between the sense of 
"and their works follow them" intended by the apostle and the sense in 
which the works of the poor mason followed him. 
Kant's idea that humour transforms an expectation into "nothing" is 
vague but not less interesting for all that. It probably makes more sense in 
the context of Schopenhauer's theory even though he, Schopenhauer, 
seems not to have been persuaded by it. Kant writes that were the expec­
tation to "transform itself into the positive opposite of an expected object 
. . . there would still be something, which might even be a cause of 
grief."!9 In terms of an incongruous relation between a concept and 
percept subsumed under it, were a positive, meaningful proposition to 
emerge, it would likely kill both the incongruity and the joke at the same 
time. So for those instances of humour which fit Schopenhauer's defini­
tion, it seems correct to insist that the incongruity must remain at all times 
an incongruity, or else the joke dies. The sense in which the poor mason's 
works follow him cannot correspond exactly to that intended by the 
apostle or else there will be no joke and the occasion one for nothing but 
grief because it is unlikely that the mason will be remembered for that 
piece of work. What makes the joke possible is precisely the lack of fit 
between the scenario and the intended meaning of the apostle's words, 
together with the awkward or inappropriate way in which the scenario 
does indeed fit the literal meaning of the words. This point has some 
features in common with Donald Davidson's view about metaphor, 
according to which to suppose that metaphors create a special metaphori­
cal meaning that somehow fits or corresponds to the facts is tantamount to 
"murdering the metaphor."20 Metaphors for Davidson, like jokes for Kant, 
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must terminate in nothing, no new propositional content, to achieve their 
effects of getting us to make comparisons between objects. One need not 
accept Davidson's conclusion that there is no such thing as metaphorical 
meaning to appreciate that metaphors require, in order to do their job, a 
recognisable lack of words-to-world fit. 
Other examples of "strained expectations transforming into nothing" 
are sophistically valid argnments, like the one I tried (but failed) to impress 
upon George Lakoff as a counterexample to his claims about transitivity 
between literal and metaphorical uses of locative terms. 
PI. I am in my car. 
n. My car is in need of repair. 
C. Therefore, I am in need of repair. 
If we allow the argument to go as far as the conclusion, supposing that the 
conclusion represents some positive state of affairs (good grief!), we have 
probably gone too far and missed the joke. In fact, it is more effective in 
telling this joke to stop with the second premise and let the audience draw 
the empty "conclusion" for themselves. Insofar as many jokes terminate 
in a non-sensical conclusion or punchline, and are funny for doing so, we 
should not expect jokes to terminate in meaningful propositions. This does 
not preclude us from recognising that jokes may, however, be occasions 
for constructing new arguments or propositional attitudes. 
We have now to ask whether the recognition of incongruity is a 
necessary component of every humourous situation, and what the nature 
of the incongruity is which allegedly makes us laugh. Let us suppose for 
the moment that an awareness of an incongruity is a necessary condition 
for humour and laughter. The first thing we should note is that it is 
unlikely that humour always depends on Schopenhauer's discrepancy 
between concept and object. There is a saying in our family-"As soon as 
one door shuts, another closes," which is funny but not because of the un­
expected subsumption of doors under the concept of being closed. Doors 
are often closed. The humour depends rather upon the contrast between 
this saying and its more optimistic and cliched cousin: "As soon as one 
door shuts, another opens." One might be tempted to say that whilst there 
is no literal incongruity in the first saying, there is incongruity when the 
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sentence is taken metaphorically. But, even supposing that there is such a 
thing as metaphorical meaning, it doesn't seem correct to say that there is 
metaphorical incongruity either. In our family at least, the lack of oppor­
tunity or success in one direction has frequently been followed by a lack 
of opportunity or success in another. (But we remain cheerful.) If there is 
incongruity, it is not of the form envisaged by Kant or Schopenhauer. 
Some things are funny, furthermore, hecause the facts, real or imagined, 
fail to meet our expectations in degree not kind. Consider, for example, 
the case of Epicurus, who expended so much energy making pleasure the 
end of all action only to think that it consisted in a little pot of cheese.2l 
Here it is not absurd to think that a little pot of cheese is pleasurable­
remember Brillat-Savarin's comment that "a meal without cheese is like a 
beautiful woman with only one eye"22.-but that it should serve as a suf­
ficient ohject of desire for the founder of an ancient School devoted to 
pleasure being the highest good is, well, funny. (What were we expecting 
through? Fast chariots, loose boys?) In such cases, a simple deflation of 
our expectations seems more important to explaining why we laugh than 
any incongruity between object and concept. 
One conclusion to draw from these counterexamples to the incon­
gruity theory is that what is more basic to humour than incongruity is just 
that our expectations are in some (okay, non-threatening) way overturned. 
But even this is an unreliable guide to what makes something funny. The 
running gag often retains its capacity to amuse despite its being both 
repeated and expected. And as D. H. Monro pointed out in his seminal 
study of humour, Argument ofLaughter, some things are funny precisely 
because they arc So predictable.23 The colleague who constructs ingenious 
excuses to shirk work every time, the Aunt who has her socks off display­
ing her bunions within 30 seconds of arriving at any family party are 
examples that can provoke laughter simply because they occur often and 
predictably so. Such behaviour is not even incongruous-it is often all too 
easily explained-and that, in itself, particularity when it issues from a 
defect or eccentricity in a person's character, can be an occasion for laughter.24 
Here it seems that it is the very congruity of a person's behaviour with 
their character, their rigidity, which is a source of amusement. 
Counterexamples like the above do not tend, however, to worry con­
temporary incongruity theorists much. The notion of incongruity has been 
expanded to include a wide range of phenomena: inappropriateness (Munro), 
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disharmony, discrepancy, disagreement in character or qualities, discord, 
inconsistency, unsuitableness, incoherence, unreasonableness, unconven­
tionality and absurdity (Martin)." "As soon as one door shuts, another 
closes," might be said to be incongruous with a convention against 
making trivial or irrelevant statements, or offering pessimistic statements 
as a form of consolation, the recognisably deliberate violation of which 
enables the audience to appreciate the humour behind the speaker's 
pessimism. Epicurus' pot of cheese will be argued to be incongruous 
against some concept, for example, the highest good, or just simply inap­
propriate to a philosophical system based on the pursuit of pleasure. And 
the fact that a little pot of cheese is incongruous with respect to some 
concepts is compatible with its being congruous with respect to others, for 
example, pleasure, that are active in the audience's mind at the same time. 
Indeed, for some theorists, humour entails that the audience judges si­
multaneously that the situation is both "highly implausible and a little bit 
plausible."26 And a little pot of cheese is a plausible object of desire for 
someone who spends more time talking about pleasure than pursuing it. 
lt should also be noted that although contemporary incongruity theorists 
argue that the awareness of an incongruity is a necessary condition for 
humour, no one is suggesting that it is a sufficient condition. Many kinds 
of incongruities are not humourous. Plastic fruit is incongruous but not 
funny. As Mike Martin also notes, even though they sometimes come 
close to being funny and are incongruities we enjoy, the incongruities 
found in surrealist paintings are not typically objects of laughter.2? So the 
incongruity theorist must be content with incongruity as a necessary 
condition and with the understanding that an incongruity is basically 
anything we find odd. But now it appears that the theory has weakened 
itself beyond having anything very useful or specific to say about humour 
at all. The compelling conclusion is that "humour" is a family resem­
blance concept, a concept that denotes a motley collection of experiences 
bearing no single essence or defining criteria. And this should be (and is!) 
a disturbing prospect for contemporary incongruity theorists.2' 
More than any other theory, however, the incongruity theory brings 
to the fore the ways in which our taking delight in the extraordinary 
depends On our ordinary rational capacities. The capacities by virtue of 
which we detect structure and make sense of the world at the same time 
attune us to breaks in normal patterns. I do not in what remains of this essay 
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want to offer a new theory of humour for I suspect that nothing is more 
ridiculous than attempting to define the ridiculous2• As E. B. White ap­
parently once remarked: "Analysing humour is like dissecting a frog. Few 
people are interested and the frog dies of it." My task here is to argue for 
something other than a theory of humour. It is simply the claim that the 
traditional connection between humour and affect is one tradition worth 
preserving.30 Direct attempts to define the essence of humour have floun­
dered, and what I shall have to say concerns not the essence of humour 
directly but one of its functions. The function I have in mind has, however, 
been brought out most forcefully by the incongruity theory. If humour is 
at least connected with our ability to detect incongruities, it has an 
obvious relation to reason, for the ability to make sense of the world pre­
supposes the capacity to detect non-sense and that which lies beyond 
comprehension. The medievals were right to regard the capacity for 
laughter as simply part and parcel of what it is to be a rational human 
being, and to that extent, it belongs as much to the practice of philosophy 
as any other method for distinguishing sense and non-sense. This capacity 
for appreciating (or generating) humour, or the humourous attitnde, is, I 
shall argue, connected with those processes that perfonn the crucial 
function of directing reason, which is not to say that reason cannot be 
directed or direct itself in other ways. And my claim is that, insofar as the 
humourous attitnde performs this function, it does so by virtne of being an 
affective attitnde. 
It is important to notice that thinking of the capacity for humour as 
an affective attitnde flies in the face of much recent theorising about 
humour. John Morreall, for example, has argued that humour and laughter 
can assist reason and our epistemic endeavours only by being ''unencumbered'' 
with emotion. 
Now in this development of reason, emotions would have been not a boon 
but an encumbrance, for in an emotional state a person looks at a situation 
practically and as related to himself or herself. Amusement by contrast, like 
artistic activities and science, would be helpful in the development of reason 
because it involves a breaking out of a practical and self-concerned frame of 
mind and an attention to things not only as related to us but as related to other 
things of their kind and to other things generally.... The capacity of humor 
to block emotions would also have facilitated the development of rationali­
ty, for emotions, which served pre-human animals so well, would often get 
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in the way of rational thinking, as indeed they still do. To be able to face in­
congruity in one's experience---especially one's own failure-with amusement 
instead of anger or sadness, allows a person a more objective and rational per­
spective on what is happening.31 
Morreal!'s reasoning, out of tune as it is with recent work in the cognitive 
sciences on the integration of our rational and emotional faculties,'2 is 
based on the assumption that adopting a humourous attitude, much like 
adopting a philosophical attitude, depends on "distancing" oneself from 
the practical aspects of one's situation, a process which both neutralises 
one's emotions and makes for greater objectivity. Ronald de Sousa iden­
tifies the same attitude behind the views of Horace Walpole who once 
remarked that "this world is a comedy to those who think, a tragedy to 
those who feel," and of Henri Bergson." Despite his general arguments 
concerning the "strategic insufficiency of reason without emotion,"34 de 
Sousa finds Morreall's point "unexceptionable in connection with wit" but 
proceeds to identify a species of mirth (an emotion which produces 
laughter) that betrays the emotional attitudes of the subject and thus for 
which the subject may be held morally responsible.'5 It is not the details 
of this argument which concern us here but rather this generally shared as­
sumption that humour approaches its perfection in wit the more it issues 
from reason unencumbered by emotions, and that, because of this, wit, 
like art and science, can assist in the development of reason. 
There is, however, something odd about this glorification of humour 
''unencumbered by emotion" and that is the assumption that humour will 
make us free, that it serves only reason not unreason. And whilst I think 
there is something to this idea, I don't think that it is obvious. The idea is 
not, moreover, all that new. One of the earliest systematic defenders of wit 
and humour, Anthony Ashley COOper, the third Earl of Shaftesbury, held 
a similar view about a certain kind of humour, which he classified as 
ridicule or ''just raillery." In An Essay on the Freedom a/Wit and Humour, 
Shaftesbury attempts to defend (what later would be referred to as) 
"ridicule as a criterion of truth." 
Truth, 'tis supposed, may bear all lights; and one of the principal lights, or 
natural mediums, by which things are to be viewed, in order to a thorough 
recognition, is ridicule itself, or that manner of proof by which we discern 
whatever is liable to just raillery in any subject.'6 
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Shaftesbury's defense of ridicule-humour directed towards destabilising 
the prejudiced views of others-involves his arguing that truth will 
always withstand the brunt of ridicule whereas falsity can best be exposed 
by the freedom of thought expressed through ridicule. Shaftesbury's idea 
that the truth is immune to ridicule finds support in the old adage "it would 
be funny if it wasn't true," whereas "That's ridiculous'" implies it couldn't 
possibly be true, (although too often when we say this, it is). Shaftesbury 
backs his witty friends for their ingenuity, fair-minded, questioning 
attitude and comic acuity in matters of religion, policy and morals over 
both his puritanical opponents and the "modem Philosophers" who can 
never agree on either one system of thought or set of moral principles and 
who are in the grip of a delusional "partial scepticism."37 Ridicule or 
raillery produces "a gentle confusion" in the audience that is of greater as­
sistance in the pursuit of truth than abstract arguments. 
But how is it exactly that truth is supposed to be immune from 
ridicule and falsity not? Suppose that scepticism were a viable standpoint, 
whilst it may be possible to doubt what seem to be blatantly true state­
ments such as "I have two hands," it is harder to ridicule them. But, in 
general, the truth of a belief or statement is not itself a sufficient protec­
tion against ridicule. Nor can it be that when we are "in our humour" we 
suspend judgement, for that would make every proposition, true or false, 
epistemically immune to ridicule. The claim that false beliefs are somehow 
more susceptible to ridicule than true ones seems to be an empirical claim 
and a spurious one at that. We can, one would think, be just as easily 
gulled out of at least some of our true beliefs through ridicule as out of our 
false ones." 
Elsewhere, Shaftesbury's target of ridicule seems less the false beliefs 
that we sometimes hold than our faculty for self-deceit, based as it is on 
"a very small foundation of any passion."'. If aimed at self-deception, 
ridicule addresses not so much a particular proposition a person holds true 
than the wider context in which the belief is formed and compared to other 
beliefs. In this way, as M. J. Scott-Taggart has argued, Shaftesbury's notion 
of ridicule plays a role similar to that of reductio arguments, which 
function primarily to show that some proposition a reasoner holds true is 
inconsistent with or absurd against others the reasoner is logically or ra­
tionally forced to accept as true.40 But ridicule, according to Scott-Taggart, 
does this in a special way by juxtaposing a person's belief against patently 
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absurd propositions. If this is Shaftesbury's idea, then false beliefs are 
more likely targets for ridicule for being more likely the products of fal­
lacious reasoning or irrationality. But true beliefs arising from defective 
modes of reasoning are also made thereby targets of ridicule. On this 
reading, ridicule or humour can serve the development of reason by 
targeting inconsistency and self-deception. It may even go further than 
reductio arguments "by pointing to possible causes or premisses [as much] 
as to the effects or consequences" of inconsistency and self-deception4 \ 
Ridicule thus serves as a criterion of truth indirectly for it uncovers in­
consistencies or failures of reason that are incompatible with the rational 
pursuit of the truth. 
One of the finest examples of ridicule used to expose a kind of self­
deceit can be found towards the end of Book II of Sextus Empiricus' 
Outlines of Pyrrhonism. In the course of discussing (useless) dialectical 
responses to sophistic reasoning, Sextus recounts the story of Diodorus 
Cronus, who held that motion did not exist. Diodorus reasoned by the 
following sophistical method: Everything either moves where it is or 
where it is not; but nothing moves where it is (for there it is at rest) or 
where it is not (for nothing can move where it doesn't exist); therefore 
nothing moves. Now that is asking for trouble and, sure enough, suffering 
a dislocated shoulder, Diodorus found himself at the door of the 
physician, Herophilus, who offered him only the consolation of philoso­
phy. "Your shoulder has been put out either in the place where it was or 
where it was not; but it was put out neither where it was nor where it was 
not; therefore it has not been put OUt."42 That will be 20 drachmae, please! 
On Sextus' retelling, Diodorus is said to have beseeched the doctor to 
leave such arguments aside and apply his medical arts, and this story, to 
Sextus' mind, demonstrates more effectively than dialectical reasoning the 
fallacious quality of Diodorus' argument against motion. To show that 
what one believe is inconsistent or "incongruous" with the very conduct 
of life is to show the height of one's irrationality. 
Ridicule often has this feature of demonstrating a gap between belief 
and action. Demonstrating such gaps brings our false beliefs to our 
attention in a particularly vivid and personal way by showing us that it is 
we who embody the incongruity or absurdity in question rather than pre­
senting it as an abstract object of contemplation. If one's colleague 
continually invents elaborate excuses to shirk work, it is annoying and 
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provokes anger, but if others imitate the behaviour in a comic fashion with 
the consequence that everyone has an equally ingenious excuse to avoid 
the work, one's colleague may begin to see the way in which he or she is 
ridiculous. If Shaftesbury is right, ridicule need not be threatening. If a 
situation is comic, negative emotions like anger can be defused. Insofar as 
ridicule has this role to play, exposing inconsistency and self-deceit, there 
is no reason to suppose, as Shaftesbury does, that it is in any intrinsic way 
opposed to the aims and practice of philosophy. And I think we may grant 
Shaftesbury the point that "truth," on the understanding that this stands for 
something more general than true propositions and includes the very 
processes by which we rationally form beliefs and avoid self-deception, 
cannot be shaken by wit and ridicule in the way that "falsehood" or irra­
tionality can. When the reasoning is sound, it stands to reason that certain 
kinds of ridicule aimed at defects of reasoning will not be possible. Had 
Diodorus held, for example, that motion and rest were relative notions it 
would have been harder to ridicule his beliefs about motion on the grounds 
that relative to one co-ordinate system, his shoulder had not moved and so 
was not dislocated, for his shoulder's being at rest according to one co­
ordinate system is compatible with its having moved relative to another. 
Can ridicule bave this effect ofexposing us, through "agentle confusion," 
to our own self-deceits, on the supposition that we are emotionally disen­
gaged? Many have thought that the cool eye of objectivity needed to see 
one's own irrationality demands precisely such disengagement. If one is 
offended or embarrassed by the ridicule, one is more likely to be defensive 
or otherwise prevented from attending to one's reasoning in the right way. 
But what I propose to argue now is that there is a deeper sense in which 
ridicule in particular and humour generally, insofar as these may ·be of 
service to right reason, require at least one kind ofemotional engagementwith 
the situation. 
The problem for "distancing" theories like Morreal],s is that, although 
reason can do many things, it cannot surprise itself, and whatever theory 
of humour one subscribes to, surprise is at least an important component 
of much humour. (I will say something in a moment about those cases in 
which we laugh or are amused despite the object being expected or pre­
dictable or already known.) If the classical incongruity theory is correct, 
humour functions to bring to our attention novel and incongruous con­
ceptual connections that are surprising and delighting. But reason cannot 
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UJlparadoxically bring to its own attention novel conceptual connections 
unless it is already in some sense aware of them, and, in that case, such 
connections ought to be neither novel nor surprising. And it does not seem 
fair to deny this by saying that we cannot amuse ourselves but only others 
(anymore than, as Aristotle noted, we cannot tickle ourselves), because 
the element of surprise is absent, since, in formulating a joke, we can and 
often do amuse ourselves as much as others. Provided that the way in 
which a joke "comes to us" is not a matter of intending to tell ourselves a 
certain joke we already know but more like something which falls out of 
a free association of ideas, we may be as surprised as if someone else had 
told us the joke. This certainly seems to me closer to the phenomenology 
of "making up" jokes, which suggests that it is radically different from 
telling jokes to others. But I shall not pursue this idea here. My argument 
is rather that the element that explains our surprise at whatever new con­
ceptual connections we encounter through humour has to be something that 
motivates reason in a certain direction but is not the same thing as reason.43 
To attribute the function of motivating reason to emotions one has to 
hold a certain view about emotions-viz, that they are representational 
states of mind and thus have objects which they present to reason for its 
consideration and amusement. I am not going to argue for this view of 
emotions here but I am going to assume, as most prominent theories of the 
emotions today do, that with the exception of so-called "objectless" emotions 
or moods such as depression or general elation or sadness not aroused by 
the awareness of any particular event, emotions have intentional content. 
I am angry that an institution has not returned my call, afraid of snakes, 
delighted about an old friend's coming to see me. To hold the view that an 
emotion represents that to which it is a reaction, does not require holding, 
as some do, that emotions are, or presuppose, judgements and are therefore 
products of reason.44 It is enough that emotions represent things as being 
a certain way, whether or not one believes or judges it to be so, and in this 
way they can present scenarios to reason prior to and for its judgement. 
This last point is important if emotions are to playa role in the analysis of 
humour, for more often than not humour requires being able to "see" 
things as being a certain way one knows they couldn't possibly be. 
What kind of motivational factor could play the role of capturing the 
attention of reason in the way humour does? The emotion Descartes iden­
tified as the "first of all passions," wonder [i'admiration], is an emotion 
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tailored to this function of directing reason. It may seem to some too 
quaint to retrieve a seventeenth-century concept for the purposes of 
defining the affective aspect of humour (and cognitive psychologists will 
no doubt be happier taking about the arousal systems that explain 
attention and working memory). Call it what you will; my interest is in the 
kind of function wonder is supposed to perform as a directive to reason, a 
reaction to the surprising and extraordinary, and a primary source of mo­
tivation to acquire knowledge. 
Descartes distinguishes between two kinds of wonder according to 
whether the object is something novel and surprising or familiar but ex­
traordinary. The first and logically prior notion, defined at Article 53 of 
The Passions ofthe Soul, concerns objects that are new to our experience: 
When the first encounter with some ohject surprises us, and we judge it to be 
novel, or very different from that which we knew before, or from what we 
supposed that it ought to be, this makes us wonder at and be astonished by 
it. And since this may bappen before we know whether the object is benefi­
cial to us or not, it seems to me that wonder is the first of all the passions. 
And it has no contrary, because, if the object that presents itself has nothing 
that surprises us, we are not moved by it at all, and we consider it without 
passion. [AT XI, 373]45 
Since we have to notice something before we develop a positive or negative 
attitude towards it, wonder is, for Descartes, the first of all passions. Given 
the effects of a sudden surprise on the blood and diaphragm, wonder is 
also the primary cause of laughter. There are several interesting ideas in 
the passage just quoted: wonder is primarily directed at what is novel or 
unexpected or incongruous (insofar as it is not as "we supposed it ought 
to be"); wonder is evaluatively neutral in that it entails no judgement 
about the good or evil or indeed even about the nature of the object; and, 
finally, wonder has no opposite for we are not moved by the overly familiar 
or uninteresting.46 
This kind of emotion is clearly compatible with the experience of 
humour. From the first point we can see that wonder has the right sort of 
objects to be a constituent of humour: the unexpected, the incongruous, 
the surprising, the novel. Beyond these general categories, there is no re­
striction on the kinds of objects that may cause us to wonder. We may 
wonder at objects that stimulate the senses, at descriptions of non-actual 
situations, or at abstractions, which are the currency of the intellect. On 
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the second point, since wonder is evaluatively neutral it explains the 
absence of overpowering negative or positive emotions, which many 
theorists have noted can prevent an amused reaction. Wonder is compati­
ble however with pleasure because we natural1y take delight in things we 
find interesting or novel. The final point, that wonder lacks an opposite, 
explains why what we know to be true does not generally surprise us, 
compared to that of which we are ignorant or which we do not expect. It 
also explains why wonder, and by extension humour, can lead us to 
knowledge by making us ponder or consider something we hadn't noticed 
before. Finally, it would show one important feature of this kind of 
emotion: since it is a reaction to novelty, wonder is an emotion that is dis­
sipated by knowledge. This has an important application with regard to 
amusement, for knowledge can extinguish or prevent a reaction of 
amusement. With some exceptions (the running gag, etc.), we may smile 
at, laugh and enjoy jokes we have heard before but it is hard for them to 
have exactly the same effect that they had when we first heard them. On 
the other hand, knowledge that the scenario represented in a joke is "other 
than it is supposed to be" would not of itself extinguish the wonder 
because the object of wonder need not be itself an object of knowledge but 
can be a counterfactual state of affairs. 
This is not to say that what we know to be true cannot cause us to 
wonder at it or laugh. Descartes's second variety of wonder, contained in 
the definition at Article 70, is directed at things that are primarily rare and 
extraordinary, and which mayor may not be new to our experience. 
Wonder is a sudden surprise of the soul, which brings it to consider with 
attention the objects that seem to it rare and extraordinary. [AT XI, 380] 
These two senses of wonder are rellected in the following two uses to 
which the word 'wonder' is put in English (and 'admirer' in pre-modem 
French): 
(a) I wonder whether such-and-such is the case, 
(b) It is a wonder that such-and-such is the case. 
Only (a) implies ignorance of the thing in question and that it was unex­
pected. In accord with the second sense, (b), we might wonder at the 
greatness of some thing that is already known to us (Descartes had in 
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mind the freedom of the human will, ho-hum), and this kind of wonder is 
not extinguished by knowledge. For Descartes, this second kind of 
wonder lacks the element of surprise and so does not cause us to laugh. 
But we need not accept that since something known is wondered at 
because it is rare or extraordinary, it is unsurprising and incapable of 
causing us to laugh. If we were to accept this conclusion it would follow 
that we could not be amused by things that are highly predictable, like a 
colleague's behaviour in meetings or an aged Aunt's behaviour at a party. 
Yet someone's behaving in a predictable fashion may mimic the effects of 
an unanticipated surprise in the way that we can be surprised even when 
a sure bet comes off. Part of what is funny in cases of highly predictable 
eccentric behaviour is not the mere predictability of it but the fact that that 
behaviour, a behaviour that is eccentric, unorthodox, incongruous or 
blatantly selfish, etc., should be so predictable. The running gag is open to 
a similar kind of analysis-what is funny is that the telling of a joke, 
something usually constituting a one-off event, should form a repeatable 
pattern. The running gag is funny for playing with the very form of joke­
telling, for being a meta-joke, and that, if done artfully, can surprise and 
delight us. Something's being unexpected is thus, I claim, a sufficient but 
not necessary condition for its being surprising. 
Both varieties of wonder are important, according to Descartes, for 
explaining the very possibility of scientific knowledge because the 
function of wonder is not merely to bring what is novel and interesting 
before our attention but to keep it there long enough to be scientifically in­
vestigated. For Descartes, it is the passion of wonder that, in the first 
instance, explains how the mind is drawn to an object and why the object 
is kept in working memory. 
One is able to say [of wonder] in part that it is useful in that it makes us leam 
and retain in our memory things we have hitherto ignored for we wonder 
only at that which appears to US rare and extraordinary and something is able 
to appear thus to us only because we have been ignorant of it or it is different 
from the things we have known. For it is this difference that makes it that 
which one calls 'extraordinary'. When a thing which we did not know 
presents itself as new to our understanding or our senses, we do not retain it 
in our memory. unless the idea that we have of it is fortified in our brain by 
some passion; or as well by an application of our understanding that our will 
determines to a particular attention and reflection. [AT XI, 384]47 
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Why attribute such functions of guiding reason to an emotion? Descartes's 
answer here suggests that the attention to, and retention of, the novel or 
extraordinary does not originate from reason (although reason and will may 
perform this function if an object is already known) so something must 
move reason to attend to a thing and this he calls wonder.4' To the degree 
that our capacity for humour or wit cau perform a similar function of 
getting the mind to attend to the surprising and absurd juxtapositions of ideas, 
it presupposes, I submit, an affective engagement with the object of attention. 
One consequence of making wonder a central component of the ex­
perience of humour is that if something is too easily explained, it ceases 
to be a source of wonder. This is useful for explaining why jokes that raise 
philosophical puzzles, like Herophilus', withstand the test of time. Philo­
sophical puzzles are rarely easily explained. It may also offer a means for 
distinguishing good from bad humour. Puns are often derided (unfairly) 
by humour theorists as one of the lowest forms of wit (next to sarcasm?) 
and the reason generally offered is that once the double meaning is dis­
covered there's usually not much more to discover49 Linguistic 
sophistication is obviously not as impressive to some as conceptual so­
phistication. But it is often hard to separate the two. A good pun--e.g.• A 
blind limbo dancer walks into a bar. ... -often offers more than a double 
meaning, in this case. a spoof on the "X walks into a bar" genre of jokes.5o 
To my mind. there are less interesting forms of humour than the pun. 
Slapstick, clowning and practical jokes, have to engage the mind as well 
as the senses in order to remain memorable. Even though it involves in­
congruous or inappropriate behaviour. clowning often requires little 
thought on the part of the audience to understand why the behaviour is in­
congruous or inappropriate. (So there was confetti in the bucket instead of 
water. ho-hum.) But even here there are exceptions. The antics of clowns 
always failed to amuse me (even as a small child) until I saw Circus Oz. 
in which a clown performed the usual clown tricks suspended by his feet 
from the ceiling. A pratfall is still not witty, but it is more interesting 
performed upside down on the ceiling in clothes and with props that defy 
the law of gravity. The act made the audience think about how hard it 
would be to appear to be performing normal tasks while hanging upside 
down (e.g., flopping down on a chair, throwing a hat onto a peg) and then 
to clown around on top of that. Some humour sustains wonder simply by 
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resisting explanation in much the same way that good magic tricks are 
good precisely because their explanation remains a mystery. If I am right, 
the best kind of humour is so because it stimulates the same kinds of 
processes we use to make sense of the world, leaving open the possibility 
of further thought in order to explain what has been seen or heard, even if 
the end result is, as Kant hinted, the converse of an adequate explana­
tion-viz, a fine appreciation of non-sense. 
I have offered the notion of wonder as a supplement to an account of 
the functions of humour, not as part of a definition of humour. We wonder 
at many things we find surprising, like surrealist artworks, without neces­
sarily being amused by them. What accounts for these differences I cannot 
say. (I suspect timing has a lot to do with it-surrealist art does not 
typically structure our thought and expectations in one direction only to 
derail it in another, but is already and immediately derailed-but I shall 
leave such discriminations to others.) I have argued that Descartes's two 
notions of wonder are particularly suited to form part of the explanation 
of our experience of humour. This experience often involves a sudden 
reaction to something surprising, unexpected or not "as it is supposed to 
be," or to something expected or predictable but surprising in part because 
of that. It is an experience which does not entail strong (potentially coun­
teracting) negative or positive emotions, and which motivates us to remain 
in a state of pleasant attention to its object. In its primary sense, wonder 
presupposes a gap between the scenario presented and what we take for 
granted and can thus explain why forms of humour like ridicule are so 
effective against hypocrisy, irrationality, and inconsistency. These are 
obvious sites for such gaps to arise. Finally, as an aid to reason, wonder 
stimulates the same kind of explanatory processes used generally to close 
gaps between what we know and the way things appear, and tbus stands 
on a continuum with the philosophical imagination. 
And finally: The ability to laugh at oneself, on this view, is the ability 
to wonder at one's own self-caused deficiencies, deficiencies which, 
insofar as they are self-caused, must be traced back to something one has 
control over, namely, the exercise of one's rational and volitional 
faculties.51 The ability to laugh at oneself should thus at the same time be 
seen as the ability to motivate oneself to overcome one's deficiencies of 
reason. The best kind of humour is the kind that activates and sustains the 
intellect in considering some topic from a completely fresh perspective. 
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And in this regard the capacity for humour is like the philosophical 
attitude, best employed in contexts where we are ignorant of the natures of 
things. Humour that trades on our ignorance or self-deceit, brings it to light, 
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